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The paper takes up the basic issue, addressed by both commentators, of whether
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less feasible reconciliation between general and special interests in economic 
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My article, ‘Beneficial Constraints: On the Economic Limits of Rational Volun-
tarism’ (Streeck, 1997), written in 1993 and published four years later, deals with a
fundamental question of socio-economics: can, should, must societies reorganize
their politics and their social institutions for the purpose of better economic
performance? In two impressively argued comments, Erik Wright and Euclid
Tsakalotos, while they agree on the importance of the subject, take issue both with
the way I am asking the question and with the answer that I offer. In some respects,
by no means minor ones, I read their comments as friendly amendments that I can
happily take on board. In others, however, they challenge major underlying
assumptions of my argument, and to advance our discussion my response will deal
almost exclusively with this part of their essays. I begin with a brief reconstruction
of my central point, for brevity’s sake in slightly different terms. Then, I will take 
up the basic issue, addressed by both commentators, of whether and in what 
sense one can speak of economic performance as a general interest superseding 
the particularistic interests of groups or classes. Finally, I shall suggest a dynamic
concept of economic interests, in particular capitalist class interests, that allows for
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a politically contingent, precarious, and perhaps increasingly less feasible reconcili-
ation between general and special interests in economic performance.
I
Can, should, must societies be rationalized in order to make them more economi-
cally efficient? Today, in a period of accelerating competitive ‘globalization’
and in the face of the economistic rhetoric of neo-liberalism that accompanies 
it, the relevance of this question is more obvious than ever. My answer in the 
article amounted in its core to a rejection of economic functionalism in 
political-institutional analysis, of the sort that prevails in much of the current 
political-economy literature, and in particular in the more recent literature on
‘varieties of capitalism’. Theories of political economy, I argued, and generally 
theories of economy-in-society, should rid themselves of functionalist assumptions,
in particular those premised on ‘rational-choice’-type ‘micro-foundations’ that
implicitly or explicitly endow actors, or at least some of them, with vastly exagger-
ated cognitive and political capacities for purposive institutional design. To 
demonstrate this I offered an attempt to make sense of a frequent but theoretically
under-exploited empirical observation: namely that institutions, policies, traditions
etc. that were clearly not created for economic reasons and with economic efficiency 
in mind, may turn out to be sources of superior economic performance and 
competitiveness. Indeed empirical evidence suggests that this may apply even to
social arrangements that were initially, or continue to be, perceived and resisted by
economic actors, in particular but not exclusively capitalists, as irrational con-
straints on the pursuit of economic improvement in general and on the operation of
free markets in particular. Examples include unemployment benefit, a high mini-
mum wage, employment protection, trade unions, legal institutions of workplace
participation, public regulation of workplace-based training, but also environmen-
tal regulations and informal codes of how to do business in particular industries or
regions.
How may constraints on economic activities be turned into sources of economic
opportunity? A more concrete version of this question would be how it is that
capitalists should be found to benefit from and perhaps eventually support social
institutions that they have originally condemned as costly limitations on, in the
term I use in the article, their ‘rational voluntarism’.1 There are several more or
less satisfactory types of answers to this. The currently preferred one would draw
on rationalistic foundational narratives of the Leviathan or Ulysses-and-the-sirens
or prisoners’ dilemma type. In them individually rational actors somehow manage
rationally to recognize the limits of rational individualism and agree to do what
they fundamentally hate to do: tie their own hands by submitting to a supreme
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ruler, or a binding rule, so as to ensure that each coordinates his or her action with
all others to the benefit of all. I did not follow this path in the article and will not do
so here, since I believe that the telling of stylized fiction of this sort, in addition to
all the other problems it entails, attributes far too much foresight and far too little
passion to human actors and thereby, rather than solving the problem it is meant
to address, only defines it away.
In the article, then, I offer two different answers, one more conventional and the
other, I believe, more original, both avoiding the functionalist fallacies of fictitious
rational-choice mythology in favour of focusing on empirically observable social
relationships and processes. The more conventional, I could also say more sociolog-
ical, answer emphasizes the contribution of normative integration to the smooth
operation of social systems, including economic ones. Social justice, as embodied
for examples in non-marketable civil, political and social rights, enhances what
industrial sociologists used to call ‘morale’ and thereby, through a complex capil-
lary system of causal connections, may make for higher productivity. Especially in
advanced production systems, an important condition of the institutions that
govern the employment relationship being efficient is that employees regard them
as fair. Work flows better, errors are more easily detected and corrected, improve-
ments are introduced more frequently and spontaneously, and conflicts are more
easily settled in a general ‘climate’of goodwill, with the help of the many miraculous,
intangible, hard-to-nail-down and yet so essential qualities that characterize an
organization or, for that matter, a society with what Harvey Leibenstein (1987) has
called ‘X-efficiency’. Justice, I argued in the article, is more likely to be perceived as
such if it is introduced, not as a means to some other end, such as efficiency,
but for its own sake and as an end in itself. Then, and especially then, it may as an
unanticipated side-effect increase economic productivity at a rate that more than
1 Still more pointedly, neo-liberals are fond of asking why capitalists, if a given institutional constraint
on economic action was really as beneficial as observers claim it was, do not observe it voluntarily, or
lobby for it to be legally instituted (instead of leaving this to their opposition). Where questions of this
sort are asked rhetorically, for example to discredit mandatory workplace participation, they carry two
implications: (1) that capitalists are by their social nature interested in maximizing economic
performance, and (2) that therefore rules that must be forced upon them cannot possibly enhance
the latter. With the first implication Wright and Tsakalotos squarely disagree, whereas I treat the 
matter as an empirical question. On the second one Wright and Tsakalotos agree and disagree at the
same time: while they recognize the possibility of economic improvement deriving from restraining
capitalists, they believe that beyond a certain point capitalists cannot accept performance-enhancing
constraints as this would undermine their class power. Capitalists, in other words, are willing to
sacrifice economic performance to preserve the political status quo. The underlying concept seems to
resemble that of the relations of production as fetters on the development of the forces of production.
While I tend to agree here, I will further down suggest a more contingent relationship.
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compensates for the economic costs, if any, of a pluralism of social values that
reduces economic performance to one value among others with which it must
share pride of place.
The other, perhaps less familiar and therefore probably more interesting,
mechanism by which social constraints may be turned into economic opportuni-
ties operates, not through legitimacy, but through innovation. If the logic of the for-
mer may be broadly termed Weberian, that of the latter could be labelled
Schumpeterian. It takes for granted that economic action, entrepreneurship and
capitalism are embedded in a constraining social context that does not, and for very
basic reasons cannot, follow the dictates of competitive markets and rationalizing
hierarchies. Capitalist entrepreneurs must live in and with a world in which other
social actors create institutions that stand in the way of a wide range of promising
strategic choices for profit-making businesses. However, faced with irremovable
restrictions on their strategic repertoires, entrepreneurs can and do make use of
their defining capacity, their creativity, to come to terms with and even benefit from
them. Capitalists, in other words, are virtuosos, not of designing and implementing
coherent economic systems, but of making do with given means under the pressure
of time and circumstances, improving new solutions where old ones no longer
work, discovering new possibilities, flexibly adjusting to changing conditions, and
generally making a virtue out of a host of contingent necessities. Almost by defini-
tion, I claim, a capitalist entrepreneur is someone with an extraordinary ability to
discover new opportunities for profit making where others perceive only con-
straints. To me, turning constraints into opportunities seems the very essence of
entrepreneurship, and is precisely what the market rewards, and indeed should
reward.
I maintain that conceiving of economic action as an intelligent accommodation
of historically contingent but for the time being irremovable social constraints
yields a much more realistic image of the operation of an economy than does a styl-
ized functionalist reconstruction of social arrangements as means to the end of
improving economic efficiency. Consider, for example, the case of skill formation.
(More examples are offered in my article.) What skills are formed in a society and
how they are distributed in its workforce reflects not just, and perhaps least, a
given structure of demand in the labour market. To a large extent the supply of skills
is a product of cultural traditions and aspirations, of a historically grown status
structure, of prevailing concepts of social justice and legitimate stratification, and
not least of the distribution of power in the polity and at the workplace. In a
country like Germany, these and other factors came together in the founding
decades of the late nineteenth century to produce a training regime that generated
an excess supply of intermediate work skills for which modern mass production
had no real use. Indeed as the twentieth century progressed German employers
found themselves constrained to rely on, pay for and actually train broadly skilled
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workers that in other countries at the time were being replaced with unskilled
labourers. Among the causal factors that brought this about was, as Jim Mosher has
demonstrated (Mosher, 2001), a compressed wage structure combined with stable
employment, both vigorously enforced by a strong industrial trade union move-
ment. However, rather than breaking down under the cost burden of high wages
and training expenses, German employers convinced themselves that, while German
society refused to deliver them a skill structure suitable for rigorous Taylorist
rationalization of the German production system, its stubborn insistence on a ‘pre-
modern’ pattern of skill formation offered extraordinary opportunities for small-
batch production of high-quality goods, quality- rather than price-competitive, for
both investment and consumption. As more and more firms discovered this, by
experimentation or observation, ‘typically German’ business strategies spread that
turned a culturally and politically given structure of the labour supply into a com-
parative advantage. By the 1970s and 1980s, a period that was to be particularly
difficult for mass producers, these strategies had built the by far most diversified
export economy in the world, with more small and medium-sized high-performance
firms than any other country,with an unmatched capacity for incremental innovation
and an apparently endless ability to discover, create and occupy niches in the world
market that were protected from price competition.2
Allowing for the possibility of entrepreneurship creatively turning social con-
straints into economic opportunities spares one the embarrassment of having to
define away the frequent empirical observation of business having vigorously
opposed institutions that later became pillars of competitive advantage (Höpner,
2003, pp. 218–22). Unlike economic functionalism, it also makes dispensable the
assumption of an omnipotent system designer somewhere behind the scenes, with
advance knowledge of how, say, high wages, high skills and workplace democracy
may in the end be profitably reconciled with capitalist accumulation. Instead it
introduces in the analysis the possibility of capitalists learning from experience and
thereby redefining, if not their interests, then their preferences (Hall, 2003). More
2 Note the time specificity of this relationship. Whether a given constraint may be beneficial depends,
not just on the inventiveness of the entrepreneurs that have to live with it, but also on markets ready
to absorb the products on which firms under the constraint may have comparative advantage. The
analysis is complicated by the fact that the existence of such markets is by definition uncertain. If and in
what way a socio-economic task environment is potentially profitable for firms operating under
specific constraints is at least as much a matter of practical discovery, and even ‘construction’ through
ingenious ‘marketing’, as of theoretical prediction. Typically theory tends to be more conservative than
practice, often declaring a priori impossible what it later has to come to terms with as empirical fact.
Moreover, the sum of the constraints in a society must not be such that it completely forecloses all
‘wiggling space’ for entrepreneurial opportunism is foreclosed.
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generally, it opens up a temporal dimension within which intelligent experimenta-
tion and continuous improvement at the bottom may compensate for the absence,
and indeed in most cases the impossibility, of monolithic functionalist rational-
ization from above.Accounting in this way for the positive contribution of contested
social institutions to economic performance does justice to the Hayekian fact that
intelligence in advanced societies is always distributed intelligence, and that social
evolution is driven by a diversity of competing forces and interests and cannot be
explained by just one of them. Undoubtedly firms and entrepreneurs are very
important for the ‘variety of capitalism’. Rather than collective enforcers of a 
coherent institutional design, however, their role is that of creative opportunists
that seek advantage in a world inhabited by many others and subservient to many
different logics with which they must make their peace if they want prosperity in
their time.
The implications of this, I belive, are vast—or may be, depending on how far one
is willing to drive the argument. Demonstrations of possibility matter in the social
sciences, as the latent capabilities of actors often make as much of a difference in the
social world as their manifest actions. But possibility is not necessity. If the possibility
of a social constraint on economic action turning out to be economically beneficial
depends on a creative entrepreneurial response, whether or not possibility will
become into reality is by definition impossible to predict. Certainly theory 
cannot expect help from those who have to do the trick in practice. At time t1, when
a constraint is imposed, capitalists will typically claim that it will suffocate the
economy, if only because they cannot know yet what they will have learned at time
t2 that might enable them to live with the new constraint and even utilize it for com-
parative advantage.3 This will be especially the case as new social constraints may
favour new firms that may potentially displace their established competitors on
account of greater ‘fitness’ in a politically redefined context.
It follows from this that political resistance to social constraints is not a reliable
indicator of their eventual economic effects. On the other hand, not every con-
straint can be turned around to support economic performance. Social institutions
may so limit firms’ entrepreneurial choices that even with the best of efforts they
cannot find compatible strategic innovations.4 Simple bad luck—contingent
3 Put otherwise, capitalist rhetoric will always be one of wholesale social and institutional rationa-
lization, in the same way as it is one of free competition. Both languages, neither of which has much to 
do with real-world capitalism, capitalists acquire from their favourite writers of uplifting fiction,
neo-classical economists, who for good reason make their money not as entrepreneurs but as tenured
university professors.
4 Where this is the case deregulation may be an appropriate strategy in a social market economy
such as Germany today. I did not pay sufficient attention to this possibility in my 1993 paper.
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failure of a business strategy that might well have worked—may be enough to make
excessively costly a regulation introduced into a political economy for political
reasons. Also capitalists may refuse even to try to prosper in compliance with
institutionalized social demands although they would in principle stand a good
chance of succeeding. Later, I shall return to this crucially important possibility.
II
Before I do this, I will address the second question relevant to our debate, namely
whether one can distinguish between higher and lower levels of economic perform-
ance in an absolute sense, regardless of the level of profit accruing to capitalist
firms. Here, I am in basic agreement with Wright and Tsakalotos. If the perform-
ance of a capitalist economy were measured solely in terms of average rates of
profit, the early capitalism of the great robber barons would be far superior to the
modern capitalism of today. By and large, it appears to be true that average levels of
profit have declined with the advance of capitalist modernization, just as Marx and,
for different reasons, Schumpeter, have predicted. Can one still say that economic
performance has improved over time? And that today’s firms perform better than
the firms of, say, the late nineteenth century?
A different way of asking the same question takes off from the distinction,
common in the American literature, between ‘high-road’ and ‘low-road’ business
strategies and economic development. In what sense would it be justified to say that
an economy performs better if its firms move on the high road, for example
competing more on quality than on price and using high-skilled rather than low-
skilled labour? Usually the answer refers to benevolent distributional consequences
and their positive effects for social cohesion. But if one agreed to leave this aside,
could one still maintain that a high-road firm was a better performer than a low-
road firm, even if return on investment was the same or was higher on the low road?
For an answer, consider what standard economic theory has to say about the role
of competition. Although it is celebrated as the source of economic progress par
excellence, it is, at the same time, extolled for reducing profitability and eventually
weeding our profits altogether. This is because competing firms are forced to engage
in steady improvement of their operations and capabilities, through technological
sophistication, adoption of more advanced methods of accounting and controlling,
improved marketing, development of better and more customized products, and so
on. Still, overall profitability may remain the same or decline, given that the upgrading
of organizational capabilities that is driven by competition sooner or later extends to
all firms competing in a given market. Nevertheless, their performance, and with it
that of the economy, can be meaningfully said to have improved.
But why should capitalist firms have an interest in improving their performance
if this did not translate into higher profits? The reason, I believe, is very simply that
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they have no choice. Indeed, as I shall point out later, it is only if this condition in
fact applies that they recognize that interest. Firms capable of high performance
respond more effectively to complex task environments. They are better at dealing
with change and uncertainty and survive and prosper in more difficult and volatile
markets. Squeezed by competition and by consumers with ever more sophisticated
tastes, firms are constrained to pursue progressive improvement of their capa-
bilities even though this requires costly investment in capital, managerial effort and
entrepreneurial creativity.
There is no reason to believe that firms are necessarily happy with this. Indeed,
to the contrary, as Adam Smith noted, wherever capitalists meet, they try to fix
prices in order to curtail what they almost inevitably consider ‘excessive competition’.5
Cartels are organized to moderate market pressures for economic progress, while
simultaneously lip service is paid to the grand ideal of a competitive market eco-
nomy. Meanwhile we have come to regard this as normal, just as we have convinced
ourselves that it is legitimate for public anti-trust authorities to force firms to con-
tinue to upgrade their capabilities, even if they would prefer to do otherwise
because improved performance costs them money and profitability is never
assured.
In an important sense, the core point of my article on ‘Beneficial Constraints’
was that the same long-term upgrading of the economic and organizational capa-
bilities of firms that is caused by competitive product markets may also and in basic-
ally the same way be caused by social and political regulation. The only difference is
that market pressures tend to be regarded as natural whereas social pressures are
often seen as additional burdens frivolously imposed on firms that are already
about to break down under the pressure of product market competition. But not
only are the effects of the two similar, with social constraints forcing firms to
become more sophisticated in managing their workforces, upgrade their workers’
skills, move from extensive to intensive use of labour, cut down on wasteful con-
sumption of energy, and learn to use more environmentally sustainable production
methods. Moreover, if one takes a closer look, the two kinds of pressure, from mar-
ket and from society, are often hard to distinguish. For example, consumers may
join in with governments and buy from producers who minimize the environmen-
tal and social costs of their production. In a more general sense, it is in large part
democratic redistribution of life chances and wealth that gives rise to the more
demanding markets and politics to which competing firms then have to adjust by
upgrading and customizing their products.
5 Which implies that Tsakalotos is quite wrong when he locates capitalist interests invariably on
the side of deregulation. Correspondingly, the Left for its part cannot be interested in bureaucratic 
(over-) regulation suffocating entrepreneurship—which even its most radical members recognize by
instinct when they go to dinner at a good Tuscan restaurant.
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Organizational learning, that is to say, may be initiated, not just by demanding
customers, but also by demanding citizens and workers. Social challenges make
firms invest in organizational innovations enabling them to cope with turbulent
external conditions and handle multiple environments governed by diverse and
often incompatible logics. Both evolving markets and an evolving society set
in motion a broad process of technical upgrading and social civilization, of the
economy as well as of individual and corporate economic actors. In this sense,
I agree with Wright and Tsakalotos that there is a general standard of economic per-
formance that is not identical with the rate of profit, and thus with the particularis-
tic performance standards we tend to ascribe to the picture-book capitalist
conceived as a simple profit-maximization machine. The final section of my com-
ments will deal with this conception and try to specify the conditions under which
it may be more or less realistic.
III
If interest in profitability is not the same as interest in economic performance, does
this imply that profit-maximizing capitalists are inevitably in the way of economic
progress, at least beyond a certain point? Here I part company with Wright and
Tsakalotos, although with an important qualification: while disagreeing with their
general argument, I must admit that under the contingent historical conditions of
today’s ‘globalizing’ economy, their empirical intuitions may be quite close to the
facts, although for reasons that I feel I can better account for.Wright and Tsakalotos
distinguish broadly between constraints that are good for profits and perhaps good
for society, and constraints that are good for society and perhaps good for profits
but bad for capitalist power—or between constraints favouring capitalists and
constraints favouring workers. Whereas capitalists might be willing to submit to
the former, they cannot but fight the latter, and to this extent at least social
constraints on the economy can have beneficial effects only against capitalist resist-
ance, i.e., probably not. By comparison, I distinguish between constraints that capi-
talist entrepreneurs learn to use for their advantage, and constraints that stifle their
creativity, where importantly it is almost impossible to determine ex ante to which
category a given constraint belongs. This I suggest depends, primarily, not on some
inherent property of the constraint as such, but on what individual and corporate
economic actors manage to make of it—actors that, to complicate things even
more, habitually predict doom if they find their freedom of choice reduced to only
the slightest extent.
In my article, therefore, all of the constraints whose beneficial effects I discuss
are of a sort that capitalists dislike, at least when they are first introduced, such as
labour voice at the workplace or strict environmental requirements. After all, what
I was trying to demonstrate was precisely that what may initially be, or seem to be,
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a profit-reducing constraint may with time be converted by entrepreneurial inge-
nuity into a profit-enhancing or at least profit-neutral one. It is this process of con-
version by which capitalists learn to redefine their interest in relation to a given
institutional arrangement which is at the centre of my concept of beneficial
constraint.Whereas Wright and Tsakalotos, the way I read them, exogenize capitalist
interests and treat them as fixed, I assume that they are to a theoretically significant
extent socially constructed in continuous interaction between capitalists and their
society, including the institutions the latter sets up to regulate capitalist economic
behaviour.
How do societies educate their capitalists on the substantive content of their
interest? Or, in other words, to what social processes are we alerted if we conceive of
capitalist interest as a dynamic social construct? What is crucial here is evolution
over time. By positing a structure of constraints and opportunities under which
individual and corporate economic actors must live and with which they must 
co-evolve, societies make capitalists develop and deploy their assets so as to fit a
social context in which, as a result of their evolving structure, they gradually acquire
a ‘vested interest’. Like other actors, what emerges from this interaction is a social
identity encompassing both normative and strategic components. A firm that has
learned to survive as a fair employer or as a quality producer relying on highly
skilled labour is likely at some point to identify itself as such, and will subsequently
be structurally and culturally averse to redefining itself, even in an economic emer-
gency. In fact it may eventually come to support social regulation to prevent ‘social
dumping’, out of a difficult-to-disentangle mixture of economic interests in limit-
ing competition and cultural commitment that it could abandon only at high cost
to both its external reputation and its internal integration. Instead of assuming
employers to be capable of convincing themselves in the abstract and on their own
of their fundamental economic interest in, say, employment protection or unem-
ployment insurance,6 it is much more realistic to model capitalist conversion to
welfare state policies as a sequence of productive responses to irremovable social
and political constraints.
Socialization of capitalist firms into an economic culture of high performance is
neither easy nor assured. Retraining firms to prefer long-term over short-term
profitability—which is probably the core discipline of the capitalist educational
programme—implies asking them to make efforts that they would rather avoid.
Parallels to the socialization of young people are not accidental. Absent certain
non-negotiable challenges, potential capabilities may remain underdeveloped, or
may not be developed at all. Capitalists, like teenagers, resent having to do what
does not come naturally to them, for example save and invest where they would like
6 As does much of the recent revisionist literature on the origins of the welfare state, such as 
Swenson (2002) in particular.
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to consume. Just as liberalism pure and simple is usually not enough to turn a
young person into a responsible adult, it probably fails to make a capitalist firm
become a high-performance organization. But while the former is by and large
accepted, or about to be rediscovered, the latter is far from that, at least in economic
doctrine.
My explanation, then, why firms resist attempts by society to socialize them into
a culture of high performance is not that they are afraid of losing power, as Wright
and Tsakalotos believe. It is rather that they eschew the effort required of them in
the course of their re-socialization as ‘high-road’ producers. To avoid that effort,
capitalists opportunistically ask government to protect their product markets and
deregulate their labour markets at the same time, both in order to preserve the use
value of their capabilities as currently deployed and save themselves from the
exertion of developing them further. Firms rationally dislike new constraints,
whether from competition or from social intervention, also because they have no
way of knowing if in the end they will turn out beneficial for them or not. Whenever
they can, they will therefore try to avoid learning, adding to their repertoire only
what they must.
Power and class do figure in my ‘Durkheimian’ concept of the economy, but in
ways that differ from Wright and Tsakalotos.‘Worker’ power for me is not a result of
constraints but their precondition. Of systematic interest for my argument are only
those constraints that are imposed by politics on firms against their resistance, if
you want, in the pursuit of ‘worker’ objectives such as ‘quality of life’ or a fair
distribution of life chances.7 For the mobilization of the ‘power to constrain’, the
democratic state obviously plays a central role. In other words, by the time capital-
ists go to work in order to make a virtue out of the political inevitability of social
regulation, they have already lost the power that is most important to them: the
power to make a fast and easy buck.
On the other hand, by taking power into account, one understands why Wright’s
and Tsakalotos’s pessimism on the extent to which social constraints can have
beneficial effects today should appear more realistic than my insistence on the
social malleability of the capitalist profit motive. If capitalists are willing to learn
only if they cannot avoid it, and otherwise refuse to make the entrepreneurial effort
necessary to accommodate social pressures, then the cultural upgrading of capital-
ist economies is easier inside more or less closed national societies where firms
targeted for social re-education have little if any opportunity to exit to more indul-
gent environments. This is what I say, more or less as an afterthought, in the final
paragraph of my article (Streeck, 1997, p. 216). Then, as today, however, my point
7 It goes without saying that workers also need to be educated for their interests to become socially
compatible. But this is a different matter, although the mechanisms seem to be similar.
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was not, pace Wright and Tsakalotos, that capitalists may emigrate because
too many beneficial constraints might curtail their power. Rather, it was that by
making it easier for capitalists to leave, globalization, in its today dominant form of
liberalization, enhances the power of firms to oppose constraints that they would
otherwise have to accommodate through learning. Power, here as elsewhere,
amounts to a licence to refuse to learn (Deutsch, 1983). If firms can veto social
constraints by threatening relocation to other countries, the mechanism of cap-
italist re-education for higher performance that I have described and that, I believe,
has been centrally important to the evolution of postwar democratic capitalism
begins to run dry: still potentially effective, it would increasingly rarely be observed
in operation.
Summing up, societies are most likely to succeed in improving their capitalists if
they manage to keep them in captivity. Only captive capitalists can become good
capitalists—i.e., ones that, under steady prodding from society, overcome their
natural inertia and mobilize enough effort to define their special interests in
economic performance in such a way that they can be reconciled with general
interests in a good economy. That, at least, is my claim in ‘Beneficial Constraints’. It
goes without saying that such reconciliation can only be precarious as it depends on
essentially uncertain and unstable virtuous conjunctures between institutional
arrangements, entrepreneurial good luck, and the challenges posed by changing
markets and technologies. Moreover, in a world in which capitalism is breaking
free from the tutelage of national political systems, alternative mechanisms must
be found to provide for its civilization. Whether they exist at all, and what they may
look like, is the great question of our time. Can the rational voluntarism of what
Hirschman (1992, [1982]) calls doux commerce substitute for the civilizing
pressures on capital that were generated in the second half of the twentieth century
by national states, governments and social movements? I doubt it.
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